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Abstract
Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an 
uttered sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim 
should be a familiar one. It has become a standard device in the philosopher's tool-kit. I 
argue that this claim is false. There is a kind of entailment—which I call “modal 
entailment”—that is context-sensitive and, because of this, cancellable. So cancellability 
does not show that a proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence. I close the paper by 
describing an implication this has for a disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice 
concerning the relation between felicity and truth.1
1 What does cancellability show?
Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an uttered 
sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim should be a 
familiar one. Its truth is assumed in many philosophical debates. For instance: it is assumed in some
defences of invariantism against epistemic contextualism; it is assumed in an argument for the 
possibility of a relevant alternatives account of knowledge which does not require giving up a 
principle of deductive closure; and it is assumed in defence of a material conditional analysis of 
indicative conditionals.2 I am sure the reader knows of other examples. The assumption is a now 
standard device in the philosopher's tool-kit. In this paper I argue that the assumption is false.3
I proceed in the following stages. In section 2, I define cancellability and distinguish 
between two kinds: contextual and explicit. I use this definition and distinction to clarify the 
assumption currently under consideration. In section 3, I distinguish between two kinds of 
entailment: modal and model theoretic. In section 4, I show that the contextual cancellability of a 
proposition from an uttered sentence does not show that the proposition is not modally entailed by 
that uttered sentence. In section 5, I show the same for explicit cancellability. In section 6, I address 
the concern that the conclusions of sections 4 and 5 depend on positing linguistic context-sensitivity
where there is no evidence that it exists. In section 7, I explain why Burton-Roberts' and Capone's 
attack on the possibility of cancellable explicatures does not apply to the conclusions of sections 4 
and 5.4 In section 8, I describe an implication of the fact that entailments are cancellable for a 
disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice over the relation between felicity and truth.
1 The research of this paper was funded by grant PUT632 from the Estonia Research Council. I thank an anonymous
reviewer for encouraging me to discuss the work of Burton-Roberts and Capone. I thank Dirk Kindermann, Jonny 
McIntosh and Lee Walters for some helpful suggestions. I thank café Gaudeamus for the coffee.
2 See Patrick Rysiew ‘The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions’, Nous 35 (2001), pp.477–514, Gail Stine
‘Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure’, Philosophical Studies 29 (1976), pp.249–261 and Paul Grice 
Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
3 Similar conclusions are defended by Robyn Carston Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit 
Communication, (Oxford: Wiley, 2002), by Grice, Studies, pp.42–44, by Jerrold Sadock ‘On Testing for Conversational 
Implicature’ in P. Cole (Ed.), Syntax and Semantcs: Pragmatics (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp.281–297 and by
Charles Travis ‘On What is Strictly Speaking True’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1985), pp.187–299. 
Nonetheless, the point has not been properly acknowledged either within the recent literature that I am directly 
addressing or, I believe, within the broader philosophical community.
4 See Noel Burton-Roberts ‘Cancellation and Intention’ in B. Soria & E. Romero (Eds.), Explicit Communication: 
Robyn Carston’s Pragmatics, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), pp.138–155, Alessandro Capone ‘Are 
explicatures cancellable? Toward a theory of speaker’s intentionality’, Intercultural Pragmatics 6 (2009), pp.55–83 and 
Alessandro Capone ‘Explicatures are NOT Cancellable’ in A. Capone, F. Piparo, & M. Carapezza (Eds.), Perspectives 
on Linguistic Pragmatics (New York: Springer, 2013), pp.131–151.
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2 Contextual and explicit cancellability
What is cancellability? Suppose that a speaker A utters a sentence “S”. Suppose that in or by 
uttering “S”, A encumbers commitment to the truth of a proposition P. Sometimes it is possible for 
A to avoid commitment to the truth of P without forfeiting commitment to the truth of A's utterance 
of “S”. If so, then A's commitment to the truth of P is said to be “cancellable” from A's utterance of 
“S”. Consider, for example, the following exchange:
(1) A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner. But I don't mean to imply that it sells petrol.
If B had uttered only her first sentence then B would have encumbered commitment to the truth of 
the proposition that the garage sells petrol. But B is able to avoid this commitment—to cancel it—
by uttering her second sentence and she is able to do so without forfeiting her commitment to the 
truth of the first sentence. Thus the proposition that the garage sells petrol is cancellable from B's 
utterance of the first sentence. If the cancellability of a proposition implies that the proposition is 
not entailed by the uttered sentence from which it was cancelled, then the proposition that the 
garage sells petrol is not entailed by B's utterance of “There is a garage round the corner”.
There are two ways that commitment to a proposition can be cancelled.5 Firstly, this can be 
done explicitly in the manner illustrated by (1), wherein “but I don't mean to imply that it sells 
petrol” is added to the original utterance. Secondly, this can be done contextually by making sure 
that the sentence “S” is uttered in a context which does not generate commitment to the truth of P 
by uttering “S”.
Various authors have supposed that cancellability in one form or both suffices to show that a 
cancelled proposition is not entailed by the utterance of a sentence which initially brought with it 
commitment to the truth of the cancelled proposition. Let “S1” and “S2” be sentences of English 
and P the proposition semantically expressed by “S2” in context C. Åkerman and Blome-Tillman 
suppose (E):
(E) If utterances of “S1, but not S2” or “S1, but I don't mean to imply that S2” are 
admissible in C and they cancel the speaker's commitment to P then P is not entailed by 
“S1” in C.6
Blome-Tillman, Haugh and Neale suppose (E) and also (C):
(C) If there is a context C' in which utterances of “S1” do not commit the speaker to P then 
an utterance of “S1” in context C does not entail P.7
It's these two principles—(E) and (C)—which I think are false and which I will argue are false in 
what follows.
3 Two Kinds of Entailment
5 Grice, Studies, p.44.
6 See Michael Blome-Tillman ‘Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test’, Analysis 68 (2008), pp.156–
160, at p.156 and Jonas Åkerman ‘Infelicitous Cancellation: the Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational 
Implicature Revisited’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93, pp.465–474, at p.465.
7 See Michael Blome-Tillman ‘Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)’, Philosophy Compass 8 
(2013), pp.170–185, at pp.171-172, Michael Haugh ‘Implicature Inference and Cancellability’ in A. Capone, F. Lo 
Piparo, & M. Carapezza (Eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, (New York: Spring, 2013), pp.153–188, at 
p.134, and Stephen Neale ‘H. P. Grice (1913-1988)’ in A. P. Martinich & D. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Analytic 
Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2005), pp. 254–273, at p.261.
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In order to see that (E) and (C) are false, we need to define “entailment”. We should distinguish 
between two kinds of entailment, which I will call “modal entailment” and “model theoretic 
entailment”. Here is the definition of modal entailment:
Modal Entailment
“S1” in context C modally entails a proposition P if and only if there's no logical possibility 
such that the proposition expressed by “S1” in C is true but P is not.
For example, consider the following two sentences:
(2) Monroe is a bachelor.
(3) Monroe is an unmarried man.
At least in those contexts where “bachelor” is used simply to mean the same as “unmarried man”, 
(2) and (3) express propositions such that there is no logical possibility wherein the proposition 
expressed by (2) is true but the proposition expressed by (3) is not. Thus, in those contexts, (2) 
modally entails the proposition expressed by (3).
The definition of model theoretic entailment requires some preliminaries. Let L be a 
language: i.e. a set of atomic expressions and complex expressions composed out of those atomic 
expressions in accordance with grammatical rules of composition. Let a model M be an ordered 
quintuple <D, W, T, C, I> such that D is a set of objects, W is a set of worlds, T is a set of times, C is
a set of contexts, and I is an interpretation function. Expressions in L can be assigned semantic 
values which are defined relative to a model. We can distinguish between the types of semantic 
values that expressions in L have and the particular semantic values that the expressions in L have. 
For example, suppose that “is red” is a one-place predicate in L. Suppose it is a feature of one-place 
predicates in L, and thus of “is red”, that they can have semantic values of the following type: 
functions from objects to truth-values. It nonetheless remains an open question what particular 
semantic value “is red” has in L: i.e. which function from objects to truth-values is the semantic 
value of “is red”. Let us say that an admissible model for assigning semantic values to expressions 
in a language L is a model that (a) assigns particular semantic values to expressions in L that 
conform to the types of semantic values that expressions in L have, and (b) assigns the logical 
connectives of L the standard classical semantic values. Then we can define model theoretic 
entailment as follows:
Model theoretic Entailment
“S1” in context C model theoretically entails “S2” in C if and only if there is no admissible 
model for interpreting “S1” and “S2” in C relative to which “S1” expresses a true 
proposition in C but “S2” does no express a true proposition in C.
For example, consider the following two sentences:
(4) Monroe is unmarried and Eira is divorced.
(5) Eira is divorced.
No matter what admissible model we use to interpret the language out of which (4) and (5) are 
composed, if (4) is true in a given context then so is (5) in that context. Thus (4) model theoretically
entails (5).
Modal and model theoretic entailment differ in the following respect. Whether a sentence 
modally entails a given proposition depends on the particular proposition the sentence expresses in 
the language out of which it is composed and given the context in which it is used. An analogous 
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point cannot be made for model theoretic entailment. One sentence model theoretically entails 
another, if it does, in virtue of the logical form of the two sentences—regardless of the particular 
propositions the two sentences express in their language and context. For example, notice that (2) in
context does not model theoretically entail (3) as used in the same context: there are plenty of 
admissible models interpreted relative to which (2) can be true while (3) is not. That is because 
there is nothing about the types of semantic value assigned to the expressions in (2) and (3) which 
limits the set of admissible models to just those such that, in a given context, if (2) is true then so is 
(3). Nonetheless, in the right context, (2) modally entails the proposition expressed by (3).
I am going to be interested in modal rather than model theoretic entailment. I am going to 
argue that (C) and (E) are false because cancellable propositions whose truth is committed to in or 
by A's utterance of “S” can be modal entailments of “S”.
4 (C) is false
Recall that (C) was as follows:
(C) If there is a context C' in which utterances of “S1” do not commit the speaker to P then 
an utterance of “S1” in context C does not entail P.
One way for a speaker to commit herself to the truth of a proposition is by uttering a sentence that 
modally entails that proposition. But the fact that a speaker is not committed to the truth of a 
proposition P in one context wherein she utters a given sentence “S”, does not mean that, in another 
context, “S” does not modally entail P. Here is an example. Consider the two sentences (6) and (7):
(6) Mia is tall.
(7) Mia is taller than 1.5 metres.
Where De is the set of objects in the model used to interpret the language from which (6) and (7) are
composed, and where Height-T is a number fixed by the context of use of the relevant predicate, let 
us suppose that the semantic values of “tall” and “taller than” are as follows:
I(tall) in C = λx: x ϵ De . x is taller than the height threshold Height-T in C.
That is to say, the semantic value of “tall” in a context C, is a function from objects to truth values, 
such that the function maps an object to true just in case the object is taller than the height threshold
Height-T fixed by context C.
I(taller than 1.5 metres) in C = λx: x ϵ De . x is taller than 1.5 metres.
That is to say, the semantic value of “taller than 1.5 metres” in context C, is a function from objects 
to truth values, such that the function maps an object to true just in case the object is taller than 1.5 
metres.
Let us suppose that in context C', Height-T is below 1.5 metres. Let us also suppose that in 
context C, Height-T is above 1.5 metres. Then when uttered in C', (6) does not modally entail (7). 
But when uttered in C, (6) does modally entail (7). Call the proposition expressed by (7) in C, P. A 
speaker who utters (6) in C will be committed to P even though she is not (ceteris paribus) 
committed to P when she utters (6) in C'. Thus (6), (7), C and C' constitute a counterexample to (C).
The contextual cancellability of P from (6) does not show that P is not entailed by (6) in C. The 
problem with (C) is that the propositions modally entailed by a sentence depend on the context of 
the sentence's use when the sentence includes context-sensitive expressions. So if one “cancels” a 
commitment to the truth of a proposition—a commitment encumbered by uttering “S”—by 
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changing the context in which “S” is employed, then one might have changed the content of “S” 
and hence the modal entailments of “S”. The fact that the utterance of a sentence in one context 
does not commit the speaker to a given proposition, does not mean that the sentence, when uttered 
in a different context, does not modally entail that proposition.
5 (E) is false
Recall that (E) was as follows:
(E) If utterances of “S1, but not S2” or “S1, but I don't mean to imply that S2” are 
admissible in C and they cancel the speaker's commitment to P then P is not entailed by 
“S1” in C.
(E) looks like it is not susceptible to the problem faced by (C). The problem with (C) was that in 
order to check whether a proposition is contextually cancellable one has to change the context of the
sentence from which the proposition is being cancelled. But changes in context can induce changes 
in the content of the sentence and hence changes in the modal entailments of that sentence. Since 
the context is held constant when checking whether a proposition is explicitly cancellable, it may 
seem that no contextual changes need to be induced when performing the check and so any changes
in a speaker's commitments witnessed when performing the check cannot be accounted for by 
appeal to changes in the content of expressions in “S1”. However, I will now argue that even if the 
context is held constant, the addition of “but not S2” or “but I don't mean to imply that S2” to “S1” 
can influence the content of “S1”. I will argue for this by describing various ways in which the 
words that follow an expression can influence the content of that expression. I will then return to the
case in which those words are explicit cancellations.
Let us begin at the sub-sentential level. Context-sensitive expressions can have different 
contents depending upon how the sentence in which they appear continues. Perhaps the simplest 
example of this is Searle's “cut”.8 Consider some possible continuations of “John cut...”:
 the grass
 the cake
 the cocaine
 the air
 the line
Depending upon how we continue “John cut” we will (typically) understand “cut” in different ways.
Typically, when you cut the grass you do not slice it into pieces with a knife. Rather, you take the 
lawn mower and you shred the blades of grass. Similarly, typically, when you cut the cake, you do 
not shred the top lay with a rotating blade. Etc. I say “typically” because you could cut the grass 
like you cut the cake and you could readily express such a thing with the sentence, “John cut the 
grass”, given the right context (as Searle shows). Even so, the correct content to assign to “cut” 
depends on (but is not entirely determined by) the expressions that follow it.
One way to describe this phenomenon is to say that the content of the verb “cut” is shifted 
by the addition of new material. To describe the phenomenon in this way is to suggest that there is 
already a content of “cut” by default and that the content changes from one content to another with 
the addition of the next word. This is a stronger proposal than is warranted by the behaviour of 
“cut”. Firstly, what is the default content of “cut”? It is not clear that any particular content has 
priority over another in this respect. Secondly, let us suppose that there is. Still, although that might 
tell us something about how a sentence that includes “cut” is processed, it does not tell us much 
8 John Searle ‘The Background of Meaning’ in F. Kiefer, M. Bierwisch, & J. Searle (Eds.), Speech Act Theory and
Pragmatics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), pp.221–232.
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about the correct way to understand the truth-condition of the sentence in context. At the moment, 
our concern is not with how we figure out this truth-condition but just with what is relevant to 
making the sentence have the truth-condition that it has in context. The expressions that follow 
“cut” seem to be relevant to this—regardless of whether, when interpreting a sentence containing 
“cut”, we first assume it has one content and then—after having read the sentence in which it 
figures—conclude that it has another. This point will be relevant in section 7.
We can get the same effect at the super-sentential level also. Here is an example.
“local bar”
(8) John always visited a local bar. He was an insurance salesman visiting a different town 
every two days or so. For that reason, he couldn't always return to the same bar. That would 
have been expensive and impracticable.
(9) John always visited a local bar. There was a beautiful waitress who worked there and she 
happened to be John's neighbour.
In (8), the material that follows the first sentence leads us to accept a reading of the first sentence 
according to which John visits a bar that is local to each town he visits. In (9), the material that 
follows the first sentence (the same sentence as in (8)) leads us to accept a reading of the first 
sentence according to which John visits a bar local to his place of residence. Thus the content of the 
context sensitive expression “local” is influenced by the sentences that follow the sentence in which
it appears. The same effect can be achieved with other context-sensitive expressions located in the 
first sentence of a string of sentences.
Finally, there are examples wherein the continuation from the original sentence includes the 
phrases that figure in (E). 
(10) John always visited a local bar but I don't mean to imply that it was the same bar every 
time. He was an insurance salesman and was in a different town every day or two.
(11) John always visited a local bar but, although he travelled a lot at the time, I don't mean to 
imply that he was visiting a different bar each time. There was a beautiful waitress who 
worked at the bar near his home and she happened to be John's neighbour.
In (10), the material that follows the first clause leads us to accept a reading of the first clause 
according to which the bars were local to the towns John visited. In (11), the material that follows 
the first clause leads us to accept a reading of the first clause according to which John visited the 
bar local to his home.
The capacity of words and sentences that follow a context-sensitive expression to influence 
the intuitively correct reading of the context-sensitive expression problematizes (E). Recall once 
again that (E) states:
(E) If utterances of “S1, but not S2” or “S1, but I don't mean to imply that S2” are 
admissible in C and they cancel the speaker's commitment to P then P is not entailed by 
“S1” in C.
In order for (E) to be true, the addition of “but not S2” or “but I don't mean to imply S2” cannot 
influence the content of “S1”. If they do then it is possible that a speaker can explicitly cancel 
commitment to the truth of a proposition even though that proposition is (modally) entailed by “S1”
when “S1” is not supplemented with the addition of “but...” Consider (12):
(12) A: Does John have a local?
B: John always visited a local bar but I don't mean to imply that it was the same bar every 
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time. He was an insurance salesman and was in a different town every day or two.
In this context, if B had not added the explicit cancellation, then B's first clause would have 
committed B to the proposition that John always visited a bar that was local to John's place of 
residence. Thus, B's initial utterance would have modally entailed the proposition that John always 
visited a bar that was local to John's place of residence. However, in actual fact, B explicitly cancels
commitment to this proposition with B's second clause. For this reason, the first clause does not 
modally entail this proposition. The entailment is cancelled. As (12) illustrates, the fact that the 
content of context-sensitive expressions can be influenced by explicit cancellations falsifies (E).
6 Context-sensitivity
The problems posed for both (C) and (E) arise only insofar as some of the expressions that figure 
within the relevant uttered sentences are context-sensitive. One might think that the problems posed
for both (C) and (E) are severely restricted because of the limited extent of context-sensitivity. For 
instance, consider again (1):
(1) A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner. But I don't mean to imply that it sells petrol.
Had B uttered only her first sentence, B would have committed herself to the truth of the 
proposition that the garage sells petrol. But given her second sentence, B explicitly cancels 
commitment to this proposition. Does this show that the commitment that B would have made had 
she uttered her first sentence alone (without the cancellation) would not have been an entailment of 
the first sentence? Well, one might think that there is no plausible context-sensitivity of “garage” 
that could account for this contextual variation in modal entailments. The word “garage” just does 
not vary content in the right way. Moreover, one might think that this is commonly true: because 
context-sensitivity just is not that common, the objection raised in this paper against (C) and (E) is 
overblown. It affects fringe cases but most sentences to which (C) and (E) have been applied are 
unaffected. In response to this concern, I will make two remarks.
Firstly, regardless of the scope of context-sensitivity, it has been shown that cancellability is 
not necessarily the manifestation of non-entailment—contra Åkerman, Blome-Tillman, Haugh, and 
Neale. Context-sensitive modal entailments are cancellable. So if you want to conclude that a 
proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence, you are going to need to show more than that the 
proposition is cancellable.
Secondly, there is at least prima facie evidence for widespread context-sensitivity. We can 
see how prima facie evidence for context-sensitivity can arise in unexpected places by looking in 
particular at the word “garage”. I will present two contexts of use for a single sentence that includes
the word “garage”. There seems to be a shift in the sentence's truth-value across the two contexts 
despite no relevant change in the condition of the world the sentence is used to describe. This 
suggests that there is a change in what the sentence requires of that world in order for the sentence 
to be true. One explanation of this is that “garage” has shifted content between the two contexts. 
This is prima facie evidence that “garage” is context sensitive. This is only prima facie evidence 
because other explanations need to be ruled out (e.g. that some other expression in the sentence 
accounts for the truth-value shift, that there is an ambiguity, that speakers are confusing an 
implicature for the content of the sentence in context, and so on). Nonetheless, this is the kind of 
evidence that many have taken to be sufficient to posit context-sensitivity for other expressions. 
Here are the two contexts.
Context 1
In the ghost town is a dilapidated petrol station without any petrol, long overgrown with 
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plants and rusting away. A group of ghost town enthusiasts approach a tour guide who 
knows the contents of the town, and the surrounding area, very well. They say to her, “hey, 
is that the garage? It's so rare to find a garage in one of these ghost towns. We're so excited 
to see this one.” The tour guide understands what they're looking for but for whatever reason
says, “No, that's not a garage. To find a garage you'd need to move on to the next town.” The
ghost town enthusiasts believe the tour guide and move on to the next town. There they 
discover that what they were looking for was indeed the object they spoke about with the 
tour guide. It being all too clear that the tour guide understood what they were looking for, 
and that the tour guide knew what they were referring to, they become angry with the tour 
guide and return to complain. Is what the tour guide said false? Here, it seems that the tour 
guide was knowingly saying something false. She could be rightly accused of doing so by 
the ghost town enthusiasts.
Context 2
Almost simultaneously—but out of earshot of the ghost town enthusiasts—a man running 
out of petrol asks the tour guide, “hey, is that a garage? I'm running out of petrol.” The tour 
guide responds exactly as she did to the ghost town enthusiasts, “No, that's not a garage. To 
find a garage you'd need to move on to the next town.” Suppose the man subsequently 
discovers that the tour guide understood what the man was looking for and that she 
understood what the man was referring to. If we asked the man whether the tour guide had 
said something false, the man could reasonably answer: “No, what she said is true. That's 
not a garage: at least not in the sense I was after.” It seems that, in this context, what the tour
guide says is true.
If competent speakers of English agree that “that's not a garage” shifts truth-value between Context 
1 and Context 2, and assuming that “that” invariantly refers to the dilapidated petrol station, and 
assuming that there is no further ambiguity in the sentence which could account for the shift of 
truth-value, and finally, given that the world spoken of with this sentence does not (relevantly) 
change between the two contexts of utterance, then we have reason to believe that “garage” has a 
content that can shift with the word's context of use. There are many “if”s here. Nonetheless, I stress
again, this is the same kind of evidence that is used to show that uncontroversially context sensitive 
expressions are context-sensitive. Insofar as the same case can be made for “garage”, there is just as
much reason to think it is context-sensitive as there is for uncontroversially context sensitive 
expressions (such as “tall”, “red”, “local” etc.).
The same kind of evidence can be generated for a great many expressions. It does not take 
too much effort to construct similar examples for words as varied as quantifiers (“every”), vague 
adjectives (“bald”), colour adjectives (“red”), non-colour adjectives (“modern”), comparative 
adjectives (“brighter than”), verbs (“won”), count nouns (“duck”), mass nouns (“water”), names 
(“Anne Grimaldi”) and others. So the range of sentences for which context-sensitivity poses at least 
a prima facie challenge to (C) and (E) is not restricted to fringe cases.
7 Entailments are cancellable even if explicatures are not
An explicature of a sentence in context is a proposition which (a) is a content which the speaker 
intends to express by uttering the sentence and (b) has a structure which is isomorphic with the 
structure of the sentence. An explicature is, in effect, the content of a sentence in context. Carston 
claims that explicatures are cancellable.9 Burton-Roberts and Capone object to Carston's claim.10 
9 Carston, Thoughts and Utterances, p.138.
10 See Burton-Roberts, ‘Cancellation and Intention’, Capone, ‘Are explicatures cancellable?’ and Capone, 
‘Explicatures are NOT cancellable’.
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Now, the entailments of an explicature of a sentence are not themselves explicatures.11 Nonetheless, 
one way in which the modal entailments of a sentence in context can be cancelled, I have argued, is 
by modifying the content of the sentence that has those entailments. For this reason, Burton-
Roberts' and Capone's objection against the cancellability of explicatures might well imply that 
modal entailments are not cancellable. In this section, I show that their objection has no such 
implication.
The explicatures of a sentence in context are, by definition, intended by the speaker of the 
sentence. Burton-Roberts and Capone both object that, because of this fact, explicatures cannot be 
cancelled. If you cancel commitment to a proposition then you do not intend to communicate it. But
if the proposition is an explicature then you do intend to communicate it. Thus, to propose that a 
proposition is both an explicature and cancelled is to land oneself in contradiction. Hence, contra 
Carston, explicatures are not cancellable.
Here is why this objection does not apply to the conclusions of sections 4 and 5; viz. that 
modal entailments are both contextually and explicitly cancellable. There are at least two things one
might speak of with the word “cancellability”. Firstly, there is the matter of whether a speaker could
avoid commitment to the truth of a proposition P which she actually commits to when uttering a 
sentence “S” in a context C either by uttering “S” in a different context or by appending an explicit 
denial of commitment to P in C. If she could do so then we say that P is cancellable. Call this 
cancellability-1. Secondly, there is the matter of whether a speaker can express a proposition Q by 
(intentionally or not) expressing a proposition P and then expressing ¬P, with the result that, in 
context, the speaker commits herself to Q. I countenanced this possibility in section 5 but denied 
that anything I said had committed me to accepting it. We call P cancellable insofar as this can be 
done. Call this cancellability-2. The first kind of cancellability is thought to be a useful diagnostic 
for distinguishing between different aspects of communicated content. I have been arguing that it 
does not distinguish modal entailments from other communicated contents—contrary to (C) and 
(E). The second kind of cancellability is a process that a speaker may go through in communicating 
a given content: she expresses a proposition by first expressing and denying another. A proposition 
can exhibit cancellability-1 without exhibiting cancellability-2. For example, suppose that a speaker
utters a sentence “S” on its own in C and thereby expresses P. However, were she to have uttered 
“S” with an explicit denial of commitment to P in C, then she would not have expressed P at all (not
even “on the way” to expressing some second proposition): she would simply have expressed some 
other proposition Q. Here, P exhibits cancellability-1 but P does not exhibit cancellability-2: in 
neither actuality nor in the possibility considered is P both expressed and denied (as is required for 
it to exhibit cancellability-2). Examples (8)-(11) appear to illustrate this possibility: insofar as you 
do not initially register the cancelled proposition upon reading the first sentence of each example (I 
do not), the cancelled proposition apparently exhibits cancellability-1 but not cancellability-2.
In the current paper, we are interested in cancellability-1 because it is that which is supposed
to indicate non-entailment, according to (C) and (E). Burton-Roberts' and Capone's argument 
against cancellable explicatures targets cancellability-2. But then Burton-Roberts' and Capone's 
charge that explicatures are not cancellable (i.e. do not exhibit cancellability-2) poses no threat to 
the logically independent thesis that the modal entailments of a sentence in context are cancellable 
(i.e. do exhibit cancellability-1).
8 The relation between felicity and truth
The fact that entailments are cancellable has implications for an issue of contention between J. L. 
Austin and Grice. They held different views on the relation between felicity (i.e. whether an uttered 
sentence is exaggerated, vague, bald, rough, misleading, not very good, rather general or too 
concise etc.) and truth. Austin thought that the two interact: if an uttered sentence fails to be 
felicitous in some respect or other, then generally, ‘it is pointless to insist on deciding in simple 
11 Carston, Thoughts and Utterances, p.123.
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terms whether the statement is “true or false”’.12 For Austin, felicity, in many cases, is a pre-
condition for an uttered sentence to achieve the status of being truth-evaluable. Grice, on the other 
hand, thought that felicity and truth are two independent ways of assessing an uttered sentence. 
There is the question of whether an uttered sentence is inappropriate because it ‘fails to correspond 
with the world in some favored way’, and there is the different question of whether an uttered 
sentence is inappropriate for some other reason.13
One reason—and I think the main reason—why Grice thought that these are independent 
matters is that, even if an uttered sentence suffers from tremendous infelicity because some pre-
condition for felicity does not obtain, nonetheless ‘most people would, I think, on reflection have a 
more or less strong inclination to say’ that the uttered sentence is true.14 In turn, Grice's main reason 
for thinking that most people have such an inclination is the fact that propositions according to 
which a felicity condition obtains are cancellable from uttered sentences. He thought that if 
someone utters a sentence “S1” and can deny a proposition P that states that a given felicity 
condition obtains (without forfeiting commitment to the truth of the utterance “S1”), then the truth-
value of P is independent of the truth-value of the utterance of “S1”. Thus even if the falsity of P 
makes the utterance of “S1” inappropriate, that does not mark any interaction with the truth of the 
utterance of “S1”.
One implication of the fact that entailments are cancellable should now be apparent. 
Consider a proposition P which describes a felicity condition of an uttered sentence, “S1”: if P is 
false then, for some reason or other, “S1” is inappropriate. Suppose that the utterer of “S1” can 
cancel commitment to the truth of P. Is Grice right to suppose that, generally, this means that P's 
truth is independent of the truth of the utterance of “S1”? No—given that modal entailments are (a) 
cancellable and (b) such that if they are false then the utterance of “S1” “fails to correspond with the
world in some favoured way”. So one implication of the fact that entailments are cancellable is that 
there is more mileage in the Austinian view on the relation between felicity and truth than Grice 
was willing to allow. The idea that an uttered sentence must get an awful lot right before the 
question of its truth or falsity can be sensibly raised (at least ‘in simple terms’ i.e. without explicit 
cancellations, for instance), is worth more exploration than it has tended to attract under Grice's 
influence.
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